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HUMAN RIGHTS AND CIVIL LITIGATION IN 
UNITED STATES COURTS: THE  
HOLOCAUST-ERA CASES 
SAMUEL P. BAUMGARTNER* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Human rights are a serious matter. Unfortunately, in spite of half a 
century of improving the civil rights of individuals through treaties and 
customary international law, and despite increasing attention to those rights 
by both governments and scholars of international law and international 
relations, much remains to be done to prevent and punish even the most 
egregious violations of human dignity.1 As if we needed another reminder, 
Professor Neuborne’s Article and the extensive briefs to which he repeatedly 
refers recap the atrocities committed by the German Nazi regime and ask 
uneasy but necessary questions about the Nazi regime’s accomplices and 
their responsibility for what transpired in the death camps of Eastern Europe 
some sixty years ago.2 His paper provides a rich repository of material for 
case study. It invites one so inclined both to analyze some of the more 
controversial issues of human rights law today and to study tactical and 
procedural issues of class action litigation—particularly settlement—as well 
as the role of civil litigation in U.S. courts within transnational society. 
Unlike Professor Neuborne, I have not really3 been involved in any of the 
cases he describes and thus am no match for his excellent and, to a 
considerable degree, even-handed advocacy. At the same time, however, I 
am sufficiently removed from those cases to try to address some of the larger 
issues that his paper raises. I am particularly interested in the role of civil 
litigation in American courts for purposes of enforcing international human 
 *  Deputy Head, Section of Private International Law, Federal Office of Justice, Swiss 
Department of Justice and Police. The views set forth in this comment are mine and do not necessarily 
represent those of the Swiss government. I would like to thank Steve Burbank for commenting on a 
draft. 
 1. See infra notes 4-14 and accompanying text. 
 2. See Burt Neuborne, Preliminary Reflections on Aspects of Holocaust-Era Litigation in 
American Courts, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 795 (2002). 
 3.  As an academic at the University of Bern Law School, I participated in the drafting of a 
written expert opinion supporting a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens in a related case. That 
motion and accompanying expert opinion were never filed, however. Moreover, in preparing the 
opinion, we were limited to procedural issues and had available to us no more than the complaint in 
the case. 
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rights law and in the way such litigation affects the conduct of transnational 
procedure in general. 
II. THE ROLE OF CIVIL LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS FOR PURPOSES OF 
ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
A. A Theoretical Framework 
Since its reincarnation after World War II,4 the movement to improve the 
human rights of individuals the world over has been very successful in terms 
of norms created.5 The movement has, however, faced considerable difficulty 
in bringing states, individuals, and groups into compliance with those 
norms.6 Partly this is due to the fact that this most “radical development in 
the whole history of international law”7 has challenged some of the basic 
tenets of traditional international law doctrine, particularly the notion of 
territorial sovereignty.8 More importantly, however, the problems with 
 4.  Although the movement to create international human rights law is often considered to have 
begun in response to the atrocities committed during World War II, there were earlier movements in 
the history of international law, particularly the drive to outlaw slavery. See, e.g., Walter Kälin, Die 
Allgemeine Erklärung der Menschenrechte: Eine Kopernikanische Wende im Völkerrecht?, in 
MENSCHENRECHTE IM UMBRUCH: 50 JAHRE ALLGEMEINE ERKLÄRUNG DER MENSCHENRECHTE 7 ff. 
(Amnesty International ed., 1998). 
 5.  See, e.g., Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 
10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966 993 U.N.T.S. 3; International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, Optional Protocol, 999 U.N.T.S. 302; International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment 
of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of 
 Civilian Persons in Times of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. In addition to these universal 
instruments, there are a considerable number of regional human rights treaties. See, e.g., A.M. 
Weisburd, Implications of International Relations Theory for the International Law of Human Rights, 
38 COLUM. J. TRANS. L. 45, 60-69 (1999). 
 6.  See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 
1935 (2002); Weisburd, supra note 5, at 51-53, 55-60, 67-69. 
 7.  JOHN P. HUMPHREY, THE REVOLUTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
205 (1974). 
 8.  See, e.g., RICHARD A. FALK, HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY 4, 153-83 (1981); 
HUMPHREY, supra note 7, at 208-09. Under traditional international law doctrine, territorial 
sovereignty has meant, among other things, that a nation state can “treat its subjects according to [its] 
discretion,” free from interference by other nations. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A 
TREATISE § 124 (1905). But see STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY, ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 
(1999) (arguing that, for hundreds of years, states have entered into treaty obligations ascertaining 
certain rights of their citizens, particularly minority rights, and that powerful nations have always 
intervened in other states’ internal affairs regarding those rights, and, hence, that modern human rights 
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enforcing various human rights regimes correspond with the teachings of 
Realist international relations theory, equally a product of the immediate 
post-World War II era.9 Realism, so far as important for our purposes, holds 
that international politics is a struggle for power.10 In this view, international 
human rights norms will be enforced when it is in the strategic interests of 
powerful nations to do so, or, at the very least, if not opposed by those 
interests.11 This view would explain why human rights were vigorously 
enforced in the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II and have led 
to further ad hoc courts for war crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia, 
while no such tribunals have been set up for the atrocities committed in the 
scores of bloody conflicts that occurred during the Cold War.12 Realism also 
explains the reluctance of powerful countries, such as the United States and 
China, to ratify the Rome Statute of the recently created International 
Criminal Court (ICC).13 And it explains the attempt of the United States to 
force those countries that have ratified the Rome Statute to declare not to 
surrender or transfer any U.S. nationals to the ICC, irrespective of whether or 
not such nationals have committed war crimes or crimes against humanity.14 
Luckily, other theories of international politics have since been 
developed. The empirical record supporting them has demonstrated what 
international lawyers had argued all along, namely that factors other than raw 
regimes have not truly imposed any new restrictions on territorial sovereignty). 
 9.  See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations 
Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 205, 207-08 (1993). 
 10.  See, e.g., HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 25 (4th ed. 1966) 
(“International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power.”); KENNETH WALTZ, THEORY OF 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 104 (1979).  
 11.  See, e.g., Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic 
Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 INT’L ORG. 218, 221 (2000). See also John Gerard Ruggie, Human 
Rights and the Future International Community, 112 DAEDALUS 93, 104 (winter 1983) (suggesting 
that human rights regimes will be weaker than nuclear nonproliferation regimes because the former are 
not as high on the list of superpower security interests as the latter). 
 12.  See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott, International Relations Theory, International Law, and the 
Regime Governing Atrocities in International Conflicts, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 361, 371-72 (1999); 
Michael Mandel, Politics and Human Rights in International Criminal Law: Our Case Against NATO 
and the Lessons to Be Learned from It, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 95 (2001) (arguing that the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia is nothing but “NATO’s propaganda arm”); 
Gerry J. Simpson, War Crimes: A Critical Introduction, in THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES 1 (Timothy L.H. 
McCormack & Gerry J. Simpson eds., 1997) (criticizing the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials as victor’s 
justice, in which Axis leaders were convicted for misdeeds some of which the Allies also committed). 
 13.  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A. CONF/189/9. 
See, e.g., Barbara Crossette, War Crimes Tribunal Becomes Reality, Without U.S. Role, N.Y. TIMES, 
April 12, 2002, at A3. In fact, the Bush Administration has since made clear its intention to withdraw 
the U.S. signature to the Rome Statute. See, e.g. Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Is Set to Renounce Its Role in 
Pact for World Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2002, at A18. 
 14. See, e.g., Serge Schmemann, U.S. v. U.N. Court: Two World Views, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 
2002, at A8.  
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power politics affect outcomes in international relations.15 Professor Koh’s 
work, for example, has drawn in part on one such theory: Constructivism. 
With an emphasis on transnational norm entrepreneurs who help in 
interaction, norm-interpretation, and, ultimately, internalization of 
international norms into domestic law—and thus “bringing international law 
home”16—he draws heavily on the Constructivist insight that the behavior of 
states on the international plane is socially constructed.17 
I would like to emphasize another such school of international politics 
here: Liberalism. Liberal international relations theory holds essentially that 
state action is the result of the identity and strength of the preferences of 
groups and individuals acting in transnational society.18 There is considerable 
theoretical and empirical research in this vein demonstrating that norms of 
international law in general and of human rights in particular are most 
successfully enforced if groups and individuals are given standing before 
international or domestic courts to enforce such norms.19 This insight is in 
 15.  For an account of the emergence of one such theory—Regime Theory, which has since 
expanded into Institutionalism—and its considerable convergence with modern American international 
-law thinking that developed in response to the Realist assertion that law played no significant role in 
international politics, see Slaughter Burley, supra note 9, at 217-20. See also Abbott, supra note 12, at 
364-68 (naming three schools of international relations theory in addition to Realism: Institutionalism, 
Liberalism, and Constructivism). 
 16.  Harold Hongju Koh, Bringing International Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623 (1998). See 
also Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND. L.J. 1397, 
1409-11 (1999); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L. REV. 
2599, 2646, 2656-57 (1997). 
 17.  See, e.g., John Gerard Ruggie, What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism 
and the Social Constructivist Challenge, 52 INT’L ORG. 855 (1998). See also MARGARET E. KECK & 
KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL 
POLITICS 6-7 (1998) (noting the importance of nongovernmental organizations and activist groups in 
transnational networks); Thomas Risse, “Let’s Argue!”: Communicative Action in World Politics, 54 
INT’L ORG. 1 (2000). 
 18. See, e.g., Slaughter Burley, supra note 9, at 226-28; Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences 
Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics, 51 INT’L ORG. 513, 515-22 (1997).  
 19. See William J. Aceves, Liberalism and International Legal Scholarship: The Pinochet Case 
and the Move Toward a Universal System of Transnational Law Litigation, 41 HARV. INT’L L.J. 129, 
160-71 (2000) (using the Pinochet litigation in Spanish and English courts as a case study to show the 
effectiveness of litigation initiated by private groups in domestic courts to enforce international human 
rights law); Anne-Marie Burley & Walter Mattli, Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of 
Legal Integration, 47 INT’L ORG. 41 (1993) (identifying the ways in which the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) created opportunities for pro-European Community subnational actors and national 
courts and thus provided them with a stake in the promotion of European Community law, thus leading 
to faster and deeper integration than most member states would have liked); Laurence R. Helfer & 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 
282-337 (1997) (tracing the success of the ECJ and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in 
terms of compliance with their judgments in cases involving private parties vis-à-vis their compliance 
record and that of other international tribunals in traditional state versus state litigation and isolating 
the factors contributing to such effective supranational adjudication). 
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line with the theory of the private attorney general that is often cited in 
support of class action and other litigation in U.S. courts.20 Moreover, liberal 
research shows that such enforcement of human rights and other norms of 
international law in domestic and international courts is most likely to occur 
among liberal democratic states, where courts act within a “zone of law” 
rather than a “zone of politics.”21 This Liberal research explains the 
extraordinary success of the European Convention of Human Rights22 and its 
interpretation by the European Court of Human Rights and of the courts of its 
various member states.23 It also helps account for the rather dismal record of 
compliance with international human rights norms in less democratic 
countries.24 Professor Neuborne’s narrative of the recent Holocaust-related 
 20. See Deposit Guar. Nat. Bank. v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980). 
The aggregation of individual claims in a class-wide suit is an evolutionary response to the 
existence of injuries unremedied by the regulatory action of the government. Where it is not 
economically feasible to obtain relief within the traditional framework of a multiplicity of small 
individual suits for damages, aggrieved persons may be without any effective redress unless they 
may employ the class action device. 
Id. at 339. See also John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the 
Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215 (1983); Patrick Higginbotham, 
Foreword, 49 ALA. L. REV. 1 4-5 (1997) (“Congress has elected to use the . . . private attorney-general 
as an enforcing mechanism for the antitrust laws, the securities laws, environmental laws, civil rights 
and more.”).  
 21. The terminology is Professor Slaughter’s. See Anne-Marie Burley, Law Among Liberal 
States: Liberal Internationalism and the Act of State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1907, 1910 (1992); 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6  EUR. J. INT’L L. 503, 532 
(1995). Despite her apparent (I suspect normative) misgivings about Liberal theory, Professor 
Hathaway’s empirical findings, too, largely support this assumption. See Hathaway, supra note 6, at 
1953-55, 1997-2000. Moreover, Professor Moravcsik’s empirical research adds an interesting spin to 
this Liberal insight, suggesting that the states most likely to agree to a limitation of national 
sovereignty by signing on to an international human rights treaty are threshold democratic states, 
whose leaders often attempt to “lock in” the achievements of democratic rule by obligating future 
governments through international treaty norms. See Moravcsik, supra note 11, at 225-46. 
 22. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 
213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
 23. See, e.g., Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 19, at 283; Moravcsik, supra note 11, at 218-19. 
 24. It is interesting, with these insights in mind, to observe that the U.S. Senate, upon the 
suggestion of the first President Bush, ratified the most encompassing of human rights treaties—the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 5, only after declaring it a non-self-
executing treaty, thus effectively eliminating the possibility that a litigant in U.S. court could ground a 
cause of action in the Covenant. See U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 138 Cong. Rec. S4783, S4784 (daily ed. Apr. 
2 1992). This happened ostensibly because—except for the Supreme Court’s case law on issues such 
as “equal protection,” the constitutionality of the death penalty as applied to juveniles, and “cruel and 
unusual punishment,” which all were to be exempted by way of special Senate declarations to the 
ratification—U.S. law was already in compliance with, and partly even exceeded the protections of, 
the Covenant. Indeed, the U.S. government argued in favor of ratification primarily on the basis that it 
needed to enhance its credibility when pushing other countries to enforce human rights. See id. at 
S4781-83. This, of course, sounds very much like the arguments advanced by the government of the 
United Kingdom in opposition to giving the European Convention on Human Rights direct effect 
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litigation appears to add further support to these insights, as well as to 
Professor Koh’s Constructivist-inspired process.25 
B. Problems with Human-Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts 
As the designated continental European on this panel, I write not only to 
praise Professor Neuborne and his work. In what follows, I point out a 
number of problems with using civil litigation in U.S. courts as a means to 
enforce international human rights, particularly as happened in the cases 
described by Professor Neuborne. One of the most pervasive obstacles to 
effective lawmaking for transnational litigation, of which the litigation 
described by Professor Neuborne represents a part, is a general lack of in-
depth information about the relevant foreign procedural systems and the 
jurisprudential preferences underlying them by those responsible for making 
such law.26 As a student of the U.S., German, and Swiss litigation 
landscapes, I thus hope to contribute to a more informed approach in this 
enormously important area of law.  
1. U.S. Procedure and the Rule of (International) Law 
U.S. courts are not the only ones in which civil claims for human rights 
violations may be pursued. To be sure, such violations are primarily 
sanctioned by way of criminal prosecutions in other countries.27 In fact, 
several continental European nations, such as Belgium, France, Spain, and 
Switzerland, have become quite active in prosecuting war crimes, crimes 
within that country in the 1950s. See, e.g., Moravcsik, supra note 11, at 238-43. Since then, the United 
Kingdom has lost just as significant a number of lawsuits before the European Court of Human 
Rights—where individuals have increasingly been able to sue the governments of member states—as 
other member states of the Convention. 
 25. Less relevant for the analysis of Professor Neuborne’s paper, but very important for 
understanding the functioning of international human rights norms, is that Institutionalist international 
relations scholars would point out that international human rights treaties and less formal agreements 
increase the costs for member states found to be in noncompliance by affecting their credibility in the 
future and by increasing access to information about compliance through reporting requirements, 
among other things. See, e.g., Abbott, supra note 12, at 374. 
 26. See SAMUEL P. BAUMGARTNER, THE PROPOSED HAGUE CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION AND 
JUDGMENTS AND TRANS-ATLANTIC LAWMAKING FOR TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION §§ 5-8 
(forthcoming 2002) [hereinafter TRANS-ATLANTIC LAWMAKING]; Samuel P. Baumgartner, Gaining a 
Worldly Perspective for the World in Our Courts (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) 
[hereinafter Gaining a Worldly Perspective]. 
 27. See, e.g., Beth Van Schaack, In Defense of Civil Redress: The Domestic Enforcement of 
Human Rights Norms in the Context of the Proposed Hague Judgments Convention, 42 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 141, 144, 147-48 (2001). 
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against humanity, and genocide in their domestic criminal courts.28 But most 
of those states also allow for intervention by the injured party in such 
criminal proceedings.29 Under specific circumstances, the injured party may 
both initiate a criminal proceeding when the criminal prosecutor fails to act 
and may join a civil claim with the criminal proceedings in order to gain 
compensation.30 This procedural specialty has been usefully applied to 
prosecute human rights abuses civilly as well as criminally in a number of 
civil law jurisdictions. For example, initiation of such proceedings in Spain 
by various victims of abuses by the regime of General Augusto Pinochet 
have led to the request for extradition of General Pinochet from the United 
Kingdom to Spain.31 
In spite of these possibilities for claiming civil redress for human rights 
violations in other jurisdictions, U.S. courts have remained particularly 
attractive for such purposes. Chief among the reasons for that attractiveness 
is the enormous flexibility and latitude of U.S. procedure—including its 
ability to create new remedies, judicial discretion, liberal pleading, the 
availability of the class-action device, and the ability of the parties to join 
every conceivable claim.32 All of this has, of course, a name: equity.33 But it 
 28. See, e.g., REDRESS TRUST, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN EUROPE: CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 
IN EUROPE SINCE 1990 FOR WAR CRIMES, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, AND GENOCIDE 16-17 (1999); 
jpk, Langwierige Vorarbeit vor einer Verhaftung, NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG [NZZ], Aug. 14, 2001 
(noting that the Swiss are investigating between six and twelve cases against persons from Rwanda 
and the former Yugoslavia); Fati Mansour, Le notable rwandais est condamné à quatorze ans de 
réclusion, LE TEMPS, May 26, 2000, at 8 (reporting that a Rwandan mayor was sentenced to fourteen 
years in prison by the Military Court of Appeals, Division 1, in Geneva, Switzerland, on May 25, 
2000). 
 29. See, e.g., Van Schaack, supra note 27, at 145-46. 
 30. Id. On the various ways in which a private party may participate in criminal proceedings in 
France and Germany, see, e.g., William B. Fisch, European Analogues to the Class Action: Group 
Action in France and Germany, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 51, 60-65, 71-74 (1979). While Professor Fisch’s 
account is somewhat dated in other respects, it still depicts the status quo fairly well with regard to the 
issues relevant here. In particular, Professor Fisch notes that, unlike in many other civil law 
jurisdictions, such participation is possible only under very limited circumstances in Germany. Id. at 
72. 
 31. See Aceves, supra note 19, at 162-64; Naomi Roht-Arriazza, The Pinochet Precedent and 
Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 311 (2001). Ultimately, General Pinochet was spared 
from extradition only because of his failing health. See, e.g., Jamie Wilson, How the General Escaped 
Trial, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 12, 2002. Similarly, twenty-three survivors of the massacres in Sabra and 
Shatila, Lebanon, in 1982 had initiated criminal proceedings in the courts of Belgium against Prime 
Minister Ariel Sharon for his role as an Israeli Officer in the massacres. However, a Belgian court of 
appeals dismissed the suit because Mr. Sharon could not be arrested in Belgium. See, e.g., Marlise 
Simons, Belgium: Sharon War-Crimes Suit Dismissed, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2002, at A10. 
 32. I intentionally do not list discovery here because, when using the combined civil/criminal 
proceeding described above, the civil claimant in a criminal proceeding in many civil law countries 
has available the full investigative facilities of the state prosecutor. Thus, while Professor Neuborne is 
correct that the evidence-taking procedures in Germany, Switzerland, and other civil law countries do 
not come close to matching the scope of discovery in the United States, this is not true for human 
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is precisely these features of equity that also render U.S. civil procedure 
problematic for purposes of enforcing human rights norms. A quarter century 
ago, Professor Chayes queried whether these features of U.S. procedure 
could properly be utilized for public law litigation “without introducing so 
much complexity that the procedure falls of its own weight.”34 One of the 
main reasons it has not is that the vast majority of lawsuits in the United 
States, particularly in federal court, where most human rights litigation is 
brought, are settled.35 The “settlement class,” although severely restricted in 
its availability by the Supreme Court in Amchem Products v. Windsor36 and 
Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.37 under the current wording of Rule 23 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is one of the last steps along this path 
toward the lawsuit as a business deal.38 In such a system, Professor Koh’s 
goal of “provok[ing] judicial articulation of a norm of transnational law”39 is 
as elusive as the very notion that “what is being applied is law”40 that 
rights violations for which a civil claim can be joined with a criminal investigation. Neuborne, supra 
note 2, at 832. 
 33. See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987). Another source not only of the 
attractiveness of U.S. courts for civil human rights litigants but also of the problems with using those 
courts for purposes of enforcing human rights norms is the existence of a number of specialized mass 
tort judges, some of whom are both remarkably resourceful and willing to push the limits of their 
judicial accountability in attempting to find imaginative ways to resolve the complex disputes before 
them. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Courtroom as Classroom: Independence, Imagination and 
Ideology in the Work of Jack Weinstein, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1971 (1997). Closely related is another 
pillar of American jurisprudence: the common law process and its view of the judge as one who can 
and should adapt the law to newly emerging social circumstances. Although not unknown on the 
European continent, this role of the judge has been much less significant than in the United States in a 
legal culture that has traditionally placed less faith in the power of judges vis-à-vis the legislature and 
legal academy. On the long U.S. tradition of celebrating the common law process over continental 
European codification and formalism see BAUMGARTNER, TRANS-ATLANTIC LAWMAKING, supra note 
26, § 2.III.A.2. 
 34. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 
1312 (1976). 
 35. See, e.g., Sam Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared 
to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1996). 
 36. 521 U.S. 591, 619-22 (1997). 
 37. 527 U.S. 815, 863-64 (1999).  
 38. See, e.g., Sarah Rudolph Cole, Managerial Litigants? The Overlooked Problem of Party 
Autonomy in Dispute Resolution, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1199 (2000); William B. Rubenstein, A 
Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371 (2001).  See also Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, 
“Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339 
(1994); Judith Resnik, Whose Judgment? Vacating Judgments, Preferences for Settlement, and the 
Role of Adjudication at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1471 (1994). 
 39. Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2349 (1991). 
 40. Chayes, supra note 34, at 1309. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 
MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1485-86 (1987). There are, of course, exceptions. In 1994, for example, a jury 
returned a verdict of $1.2 billion against the estate of Ferdinand Marcos on behalf of a class of 10,023 
Philippinos for torture, summary execution, disappearance, and prolonged arbitrary detention. See In 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss3/7
p835 Baumgartner book pages.doc 1/13/2003   12:44 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2002] HUMAN RIGHTS AND CIVIL LITIGATION 843 
 
 
 
 
 
underlies the liberal research referred to above.41 
Where I come from, the prevailing view of adjudication remains 
relatively formalist, perhaps too much so.42 The main concern is to cabin 
judicial power.43 Similarly, positivism predominates.44 But one need not be a 
hard positivist and a formalist to believe that it would be quite a stretch to 
argue that law is simply what the parties negotiate under pressure of the 
power of the trial judge. Rejecting such a view, what is the norm of law, 
particularly the norm of international or (following Professor Koh) of 
transnational law applied in, or emanating from, the Holocaust-era litigation? 
Professor Neuborne’s paper is replete with strategic and moral judgments. He 
praises Chief Judge Korman for leaving the parties in limbo over where he 
might come out,45 while criticizing Judges Greenaway and Debevoise for 
actually ruling and thus compromising the German settlement.46 He equally 
criticizes a group of plaintiffs attorneys in the Swiss litigation for 
compromising the Swiss settlement by publicly airing views not in 
conformity with the plaintiffs’ Executive Committee.47 He further criticizes 
Judge Kram for accepting a settlement containing a probably worthless 
assignment of claims against German banks in the Austrian settlement and 
then holding up the German settlement in trying to correct the mistake.48 And 
he makes clear that, in his view, significantly more money should have 
resulted from all three settlements “to even begin to approach real 
compensation,” but that what has been accomplished is still considerable.49 
re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied 513 
U.S. 1126 (1995); Ralph Steinhardt, Fulfilling the Promise of Filartiga: Litigating Human Rights 
Claims Against the Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 20 YALE J. INT’L L. 65 (1995). 
 41. See supra text accompanying notes 18-24. 
 42. Unfortunately for comparative analysis, the term “formalism” in the United States has had a 
negative connotation since the advent of antiformalism and legal realism earlier in the past century. 
See, e.g., Brian Leiter, Positivism, Formalism, Realism, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1138, 1144 (1999) (book 
review). Professor Neuborne himself has offered a particularly colorful and unflattering critique, see 
Burt Neuborne, Of Sausage Factories and Syllogism Machines: Formalism, Realism, and 
Exclusionary Selection Techniques, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 419 (1992), with which he follows in the 
footsteps of Montesquieu’s ridiculing of a view of the judge as “la bouche qui prononce les paroles de 
la loi.” CHARLES-LOUIS DE MONTESQUIEU, DE L’ESPRIT DES LOIS, ch. 6 (1748). The continental 
European views on adjudication that I refer to in the text have, of course, long since abandoned such a 
strict syllogistic understanding, if they ever adhered to it. See, e.g., Samuel P. Baumgartner, Related 
Actions, 3 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR ZIVILPROZESS INTERNATIONAL 203, 217-18 (1998). 
 43. See, e.g., TRANS-ATLANTIC LAWMAKING, supra note 26, § 9.III.C. See also supra note 33. 
 44. See, e.g., TRANS-ATLANTIC LAWMAKING, supra note 26, § 1. On formalism and positivism 
see Leiter, supra note 42, at 1140-47, 1150-53. 
 45. Neuborne, supra note 2, at 807. 
 46. Id. at 815. 
 47. Id. at 806 n.27. 
 48. Id. at 818. 
 49. Id. at 828 n.120. 
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However, there is little in Professor Neuborne’s paper to identify the legal 
norms on which these views are premised. To be sure, some of his footnotes 
and the briefs he repeatedly refers to contain a plethora of good and 
interesting legal arguments, both under domestic and international law. But 
ultimately, I suspect, they, as well as the legal arguments of the defendants, 
were only of secondary importance in the outcome of the litigation. As 
Professor Neuborne observes, no American court has yet ruled on a 
Holocaust claim on the merits.50 Moreover, consider his account of how the 
Swiss settlement was reached: At a dinner at a landmark Brooklyn restaurant, 
Chief Judge Korman cites a number after seeing some of the plaintiff’s 
evidence and both sides cannot help but accept, knowing full well that a 
rejection of the Chief Judge’s offer can only hurt their respective cases.51 The 
real negotiations only begin after this “settlement in principle” is reached, 
when the defendants attempt to achieve as global a peace as possible while 
the plaintiffs can only hope to prevent a watering-down of the amount 
agreed.52 
Some will insist that this sort of negotiation always takes place in the 
“shadow of the law.”53 Indeed, the easiest of the claims (and incidentally the 
one apparently worth the most within the Swiss litigation),54 the deposited 
assets claim, had much to commend it from a domestic law perspective,55 
although crucial questions such as choice of law56 and the most obvious 
difficulty under Swiss law—the running of the statute of limitations57—
remained undecided here, as well. Where, however, a claim is not based on 
traditional and mostly well-settled questions of private law, but rather on 
 50. Id. at 805 n.23. 
 51. Id. at 807 n.33. 
 52. Id. at 808. 
 53. See Robert Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case 
of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979). 
 54. See Neuborne, supra note 2, at 812 (noting that of the $1.25 billion settlement, $800 million 
was allocated to deposited assets claims, $200 million to slave labor claims, and $100 million to looted 
assets claims). 
 55. See id. at 807 n.31 (noting his hunch that Chief Judge Korman, “if forced to issue an opinion, 
. . . would uphold the claim for bank deposits . . . but might well strike down plaintiffs’ more 
adventurous claims premised on international law”). 
 56. On the difficult choice-of-law issues in these cases from a Swiss perspective, see, e.g., 
DANIEL GIRSBERGER, DAS INTERNATIONALE PRIVATRECHT DER NACHRICHTENLOSEN VERMÖGEN IN 
DER SCHWEIZ/PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND UNCLAIMED ASSETS IN SWITZERLAND (1997). 
 57. In another concession to the transactional nature of American civil procedure, the defendants 
failed to raise the statute-of-limitations defense, apparently in exchange for avoiding extensive 
discovery, Neuborne, supra note 2, at 813, and with it, I assume, avoiding the involvement of the 
Swiss government, whose likely vigorous defense of Swiss sovereignty and bank secrecy might have 
compromised the defendants’ credibility with both of its negotiating partners: Chief Judge Korman and 
the plaintiffs’ attorneys. 
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novel legal theories and difficult questions of international law, as were the 
claims based on corporate responsibility for harm inflicted by the German 
state,58 bargaining for the most part takes place, as Professor Subrin has 
observed, in the “shadow of a shadow”59 in a litigation system that today 
produces few, if any, precedents,60 let alone legislative solutions worthy of 
the name.61 When combined with the next factor to be discussed here—
political pressure by the U.S. government, this sort of litigation leaves the 
impression abroad that what matters for the outcome is not the rule of law, 
but the relative power of the litigants and of the governments that they are 
able to mobilize.62 Indeed, one of the factors increasingly distressing 
European observers of the Swiss and the German litigation, as time wore on, 
was that, although the defendant companies had some good points to make 
and although it would be interesting to see how their arguments would affect 
adjudication, these arguments really did not matter.63 This is hardly a 
 58. The plaintiffs’ claim of corporate responsibility for human rights violations by a state was 
both relatively novel and difficult under international law. For a reconsideration of the difficult issues 
involved in such a claim and a suggested approach, see Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human 
Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443 (2001).  
 59. Subrin, supra note 33, at 989. 
 60. As Professor Rubenstein observes, the problem lies not only in a rising lack of adjudication 
but in an equally increasing substitution of transactional work for traditional litigation work—the 
writing of briefs, motions, and the preparation of legal arguments in court—among class action 
attorneys. See Rubenstein, supra note 38, at 420-22. 
 61.  See, e.g., Chief Justice Rehnquist’s repeated, but so far futile, calls for a legislative solution 
to the Asbestos litigation. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 865 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
From this perspective, the German settlement has much to commend it, for it resulted in German 
legislation and thus in a form of conflict resolution for large-scale claims preferable from a German 
point of view. See, e.g., Gerhard Walter, Mass Tort Litigation in Germany and Switzerland, 11 DUKE 
J. COMP. & INT’L L. 369, 376 (2001). Here, too, however, the problem remains that the legislation 
came about only after insistent pressure from litigation in U.S. courts, the outcome of which was less 
than clear under applicable norms, and, more importantly, from strong political pressure by both state 
and federal legislatures in the United States, thus putting into question the internalization of this treaty 
solution in Germany as expression of a new norm of customary international law. See, e.g., 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 (1987) 
(requiring opinio iuris). 
 62. See, e.g., Burkhard Heß, Entschädigung für NS-Zwangsarbeit vor US-amerikanischen und 
deutschen Zivilgerichten, 44 AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 145, 154 (1999) (observing that, “due to the 
[American] procedural structure, this is less about questions of law than it is about power”) (translation 
by the author). 
 63.  See, e.g., Burkhard Heß, Staatenimmunität bei Menschenrechtsverletzungen, in WEGE ZUR 
GLOBALISIERUNG DES RECHTS 269, 284 (Reinhold Geimer, ed., 1999) (suggesting that civil litigation 
under these circumstances appears to be a mere means of forcing a favorable political solution between 
the countries involved); Detlev Vagts et al., Mit Prozessieren den Holocaust bewältigen? Die Rolle 
des Zivilrechts und Zivilprozesses beim Versuch der Wiedergutmachung internationaler Katastrophen, 
118 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR SCHWEIZERISCHES RECHT, NEUE FOLGE 511, 521 (1999) (noting Professor 
Drolshammer’s statement at a panel discussion at Harvard Law School discussing the Holocaust-
related cases that Europeans are not used to the kind of mobilization of political and economic power 
of the federal and state governments of the United States to support civil litigation and thus tend to 
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principled basis upon which to “promote a political settlement [on an issue of 
transnational law] in which both governmental and nongovernmental entities 
will participate.”64 This aspect deserves serious attention for those of us 
seeking to improve the rights of human beings in transnational society.  
2. Power Politics (or the Perception Thereof) 
The Swiss litigation, the reaction to which I am most familiar with, nicely 
demonstrates the problems arising from using the political power of the 
federal and state governments of the United States to supports human rights 
claimants in U.S. courts. After initial despair over sanctimonious posturing 
by some of the plaintiffs’ lawyers (who are not favorably mentioned by 
Professor Neuborne) and in the face of continued hostility by some segments 
of the Swiss population,65 the plaintiffs were met with considerable sympathy 
by a Swiss public that has always been quite critical of some of its banks’ 
motives.66 In line with that sentiment, the Swiss government quickly 
earmarked a large part of the proceeds from a planned sale of its gold 
reserves for compensation of the victims of the Swiss banks’ behavior during 
World War II in the form of a “Solidarity Fund.”67 To some degree, the 
view them simply as a form of American imperialism and hegemony). 
 64. Koh, supra note 39, at 2349. The problem is further compounded by a U.S. judiciary that, 
from the 1940s to the 1960s, created, or expanded upon, a number of doctrines, such as act of state, 
political question, comity, and the non-self-executing character of treaties, to avoid having to 
adjudicate issues of international law for which it supposedly lacks institutional competence. See id. at 
2356-58. The result has been that negotiations over claims premised on international law are colored 
much more by assumptions of whether a dismissal on justiciability grounds is likely before a particular 
judge, as happened in the German litigation described by Professor Neuborne, than by the “shadow” of 
the claimed norm of international law. 
 65. The wartime generation in particular had difficulty with the notion that its ability to keep 
Switzerland out of harms way was anything other than heroic, for it had lived through the constant fear 
of invasion from, and, through lengthy active duty, had defended the country against, possible attacks 
by the Axis powers surrounding Switzerland at the time, and had experienced the enormous 
deprivation that had resulted from that situation. But this generation had also been influenced by the 
Swiss government’s propaganda of the time, which had both vilified the Germans and emphasized the 
importance of individual sacrifice to defend the country without mentioning the less heroic 
concessions to the Nazis that the Swiss government felt necessary to make or—such as identification 
of Jews through special stamps in their passports—even eagerly proposed to the Germans. See, e.g., 
Hans Senn, “Ich war dabei, habe nachgeforscht und nachgedacht,” in: “. . . denn es ist alles wahr”, 
Erinnerungen und Geschichte 1939-99, Bundesarchiv Dossier 11, 121. For a brief assessment of these 
Swiss fears and actions under international law in English, see Detlev Vagts, Switzerland, 
International Law and World War II, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 466 (1997). 
 66. See, e.g., Robert Hauser, Aktuelle Fragen zum schweizerischen Bankgeheimnis, 40 
JURISTENZEITUNG [JZ] 871, 872 (1985) (noting several political sources of criticism of behavior of 
Swiss banks). 
 67. See, e.g., Alan Cowell, Swiss to Use Gold for a Holocaust Fund, N.Y. TIMES, March 6, 1997, 
at A5. 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss3/7
p835 Baumgartner book pages.doc 1/13/2003   12:44 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2002] HUMAN RIGHTS AND CIVIL LITIGATION 847 
 
 
 
 
 
process also had the beneficial effect of forcing the Swiss to revisit some of 
the more unpleasant aspects of their country’s history.68 When, however, the 
governments of California and New York decided to boycott Swiss banks69 
and when Senator Alfonse D’Amato, then Chairman of the Banking 
Committee, in an obvious attempt to garner favor among his constituency, 
threatened to conduct hearings on the behavior of Swiss banks during World 
War II,70 the mood rapidly changed.71 And when the $1.25 billion settlement 
became public, a great number of editorialists, members of Parliament, and 
other protagonists of public opinion berated the Swiss banks for selling out to 
the “blackmail” from overseas.72 
Perhaps, as Professor Neuborne points out, the “blackmail” argument is 
unfair.73 And one can certainly argue, as he does, that there is nothing wrong 
with utilizing political clout to force a settlement on a claim one believes to 
be well founded.74 Let me suggest, however, that those who favor the use of 
the political power of the United States to force a settlement on foreign 
defendants in a litigation system in which legal norms appear to play only a 
secondary role engage the costs of such an approach. Professor Neuborne 
mentions the possible rise of anti-Semitic sentiment in Switzerland as one 
such cost.75 Although fortunately this development may have been of short 
duration, another casualty may have been the Solidarity Fund. After the 
settlement became public, the legislation creating that Fund languished in 
Parliament, gradually diminishing in size.76 Ultimately, the Swiss rejected the 
 68. In December of 1996, the Swiss government empanelled a commission of independent 
historians to study Switzerland’s role during World War II. After five years of study, the final findings 
of the Commission, named after its chairman, Jean-François Bergier, were released in March 2002. 
The findings were in many ways quite critical of Swiss policies at that time. Bergier Commission 
Findings, at http://www.uek.ch. 
 69. See, e.g., David Cay Johnston, New York Officials to Impose Sanctions on Swiss Banks Sept. 
1, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1998, at A3; David Cay Johnston, Two States Outline Sanctions on Swiss Banks 
in Holocaust Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1998, at A5. 
 70. See, e.g., Profanierung des Holocaust im Wahlkampf, Kritik an den populistischen Strategien 
Senator D’Amatos, NZZ, Oct. 29, 1998. 
 71. See, e.g., Vagts et al., supra note 63, at 520 (quoting statement of Swiss Minister Beglinger); 
“Dem Bundesrat fehlt jegliches Verständnis . . . ”, Schweizerische Reaktionen auf New Yorker 
Boykottdrohungen, NZZ, July 3, 1998. 
 72. See, e.g., Elizabeth Olson, Swiss Are Relieved, but Sour, Over Banks’ Holocaust Accord, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1998, at A13. 
 73. See Neuborne, supra note 2, at 828 n.117. 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. at 828 n.118. 
 76. While the Swiss Executive had originally proposed exclusively to use the yearly interests on 
a $4.7 billion fund for victims of the Holocaust and other human rights violations, more and more of 
that money was appropriated purely for Swiss purposes, including the Swiss social security fund, in 
the process. Compare Cowell, supra note 67 with Botschaft betreffend die Verwendung von 
Goldreserven und ein Bundesgesetz über die Stiftung solidarische Schweiz, May 17, 2000, Bbl. 2000, 
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measure in a referendum.77 
What most clearly suffers under such an approach, however, is the 
credibility of the United States in attempting to persuade other countries to 
conform with established human rights norms. This credibility suffers further 
from the fact that the same U.S. government that throws its weight behind 
various human rights claims against foreign companies at home appears to be 
unwilling to commit to basic human rights treaties that are not in its political 
or strategic interest, such as the Statute of the new International Criminal 
Court,78 allows state courts to inflict capital punishment in situations that are 
considered in violation of human rights law elsewhere,79 and appears to see 
nothing wrong in sending suspected terrorists to Middle Eastern countries 
that still allow torture and other inhumane practices to force the suspect to 
talk.80 
Under these circumstances, any moral argument, as well as Professor 
Neuborne’s celebration of the American procedural system and what he 
himself calls his “jingoistic point,”81 all come with a decidedly sour taste 
from the point of view of a foreign lawyer. But the costs may be even larger. 
The Swiss Holocaust litigation has apparently contributed to the rise of anti-
Americanism with regard to everything having to do with the U.S. legal 
system.82 For example, while Professors Stürner and Wiegand ably 
documented what they called the “reception of American law in Europe” a 
decade ago,83 comparing the adoption of U.S. solutions in continental Europe 
3979 and Botschaft zur Volksinitiative “Überschüssige Goldreserven in den AHV-Fonds 
(Goldinitiative),” Feb. 28, 2001, Bbl. 2001, 1403. See also François Gross, Solidarité? Mon oeil!, LE 
TEMPS, Mar. 18, 2002. 
 77. See, e.g., Der Souverän hat gesprochen. Aber Was?, NZZ, Sept. 23, 2002. 
 78. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. Cf. supra note 24. 
 79. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Paying “Decent Respect” to World Opinion on the Death 
Penalty, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1085, 1105-06 (2002). But see Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242 
(2002) (declaring execution of mentally retarded individuals “cruel and unusual punishment” under the 
Eight Amendment of the U.S. Constitution). 
 80. See, e.g., Rajiv Chandrasekaran & Peter Finn, U.S. Behind Secret Transfer of Terror 
Suspects, WASH. POST, March 11, 2002, at A1, A15. For these purposes it does not exactly help that 
the leading figures of the Bush foreign policy team are declared Realists, see, e.g., Elaine Sciolino, 
Compulsion to Achieve: Condoleezza Rice, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2000, at A1, whose policy 
preferences in this area have become painfully clear since the events of Sept. 11, 2001. See, e.g., 
Michael Ignatieff, Is the Human Rights Era Ending?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2002, at A25. 
 81. See Neuborne, supra note 2, at 831. 
 82. This is, of course, only the latest wave in a development that began much earlier. See TRANS-
ATLANTIC LAWMAKING, supra note 26, at § 1. 
 83. See Rolf Stürner, Die Rezeption U.S.-amerikanischen Rechts in der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, in FESTSCHRIFT REBMANN 839 (1989); Wolfgang Wiegand, Americanization of Law: 
Reception or Convergence?, in LEGAL CULTURE AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 137 (Lawrence M. 
Friedman & Harry N. Schreiber ed., 1996); Wolfgang Wiegand, The Reception of American Law in 
Europe, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 229 (1991).  
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to the reception of Roman law in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, 
Professor Honsell, in a 1999 article, used everything from class action 
litigation to punitive damages to “three strikes and you’re out” legislation to 
the impeachment of former President Clinton to argue that U.S. law is 
incapable of distinguishing the serious from the trivial, the most important 
attribute of law.84  
As I have shown in a case study elsewhere, such circumstances provide 
fertile ground for corporations to fill the information deficit about U.S. 
procedure in those countries by spreading as the truth the view of the U.S. 
litigation landscape usually held by the proponents of tort reform.85 The 
result is, as you may imagine, a picture of U.S. litigation practice sadly 
lacking in perspective,86 but one that, as I have also shown, may be 
instrumental in guiding approaches to transnational litigation involving the 
United States, particularly with regard to issues of judgments recognition and 
judicial cooperation.87 As a result, litigants in future transnational cases in 
U.S. courts, including human rights litigants, may pay the bill for the 
aggressiveness of those who have gone before them. All of which, of course, 
should raise the question of who should make the decision on whether those 
costs are worth incurring. 
 84. See Heinrich Honsell, Amerikanische Rechtskultur, in DER EINFLUSS DES EUROPÄISCHEN 
RECHTS AUF DIE SCHWEIZ 39 (Peter Forstmoser et al. eds., 1999). Moreover, as Professor Honsell 
rightly points out, some of the borrowings identified by Professor Wiegand have been the result of 
insistent U.S. pressure and thus have not occurred voluntarily. Id., at 52-53. See also Regina Kiener & 
Raphael Lanz, Amerikanisierung des schweizerischen Rechts—und ihre Grenzen, 119 ZEITSCHRIFT 
FÜR SCHWEIZERISCHES RECHT, NEUE FASSUNG, 155 (2000) (exploring the limits of emulating what 
the authors consider the pathologies of the U.S. legal system in Switzerland). 
 85. See Gaining a Worldly Perspective, supra note 26.  
 86. Cf. Burbank, supra note 40, at 1467-68. For an example, see Kiener & Lanz, supra note 84, 
at 155: 
The American legal system is identified by characteristics, whose most spectacular varieties 
[include the following]: Generally, there appears to be a great readiness to sue; for relatively 
insignificant infliction of harm, apparently absurd amounts for damages are claimed and also 
awarded; class actions against financially strong enterprises or entire segments of the economy are 
brought in order to force the opponent to the negotiating table and thus to force him into accepting 
astronomical settlement amounts. 
Id. (translated by author). This depiction of the U.S. litigation landscape does not appear in a polemic 
against the United States or its legal system but rather in a serious and thought-provoking law review 
article in one of the leading academic journals in Switzerland. On some of the problems with these 
views in the United States, see, e.g., Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends 
About the Civil Justice System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717 (1998). 
 87. See Gaining a Worldly Perspective, supra note 26. 
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3. Judicial Jurisdiction 
At the beginning of the Holocaust-related litigation described by 
Professor Neuborne, much exasperation was informally expressed in Austria, 
Germany, and Switzerland over the extensive judicial jurisdiction asserted by 
U.S. courts in such cases. However, I do not believe that customary 
international law can be shown to impose any significant limits on judicial 
jurisdiction.88 It also seems to me that at least Germany and Austria, with 
their assets jurisdiction,89 can reach quite far jurisdictionally themselves (not 
to speak of France, where a French national can sue anyone in French 
court90). Moreover, in light of the universality principle,91 any attempt to 
limit the judicial jurisdiction over human rights cases would be misguided. 
For all these reasons, I think that the argument against judicial jurisdiction 
was more of a proxy for displeasure with other aspects of the U.S. litigation 
as I have presented them above. As such it is an argument that is not to be 
taken lightly because it may well have influenced the decision of Europeans 
to push hard for the limitation of U.S. jurisdiction in exchange for improving 
the recognition and enforcement of U.S. judgments within the framework of 
the Convention on Jurisdiction and Judgments currently being negotiated at 
The Hague.92 Thus, U.S. litigants may have incurred another cost of the 
Holocaust-related litigation described by Professor Neuborne.93 It is a cost 
that significantly affects potential human rights claimants in U.S. courts and 
elsewhere, for it appears that the episode has led several governments other 
than those traditionally ambivalent about human rights94 to press for clear 
limits on a suggested exception from the black list of jurisdictional grounds 
 88. But see, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 421; Gary B. Born, Reflections on Judicial Jurisdiction in International Cases, 17 GA. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 18-20 (1987). 
 89. German ZPO § 23; Austrian Jurisdiktionsnorm § 99. 
 90. French Code Civil art. 14. On all this, see TRANS-ATLANTIC LAWMAKING, supra note 26, 
§ 3.II.B. 
 91. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 404. 
 92. See Hague Conference, Summary of the Outcome of the Discussion in Commission II of the 
First Part of the Diplomatic Conference 6-20 June 2001, Interim Text, available at: 
http://www.hcch.net/e/workprog/jdgm.html. On the interests of the participants in the negotiations at 
The Hague, see, e.g., TRANS-ATLANTIC LAWMAKING, supra note 26. 
 93. It may well be, of course, that the strong European stance at The Hague will lead the U.S. 
negotiators to abandon the project, thus preventing any treaty limits on U.S. jurisdiction. See TRANS-
ATLANTIC LAWMAKING, supra note 26. If so, however, U.S. litigants will have foregone a chance at 
improving the enforceability of U.S. judgments abroad. Id. 
 94. See, e.g., Van Schaack, supra note 27, at 187-88 (discussing Chinese proposal). 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss3/7
p835 Baumgartner book pages.doc 1/13/2003   12:44 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2002] HUMAN RIGHTS AND CIVIL LITIGATION 851 
 
 
 
 
 
that may not be used in a member state for human rights litigation in the 
proposed Convention.95 
4. Comparison of Litigation Systems 
As I have argued at length elsewhere, avoiding such unexpected costs, or 
at least assessing them in advance in transnational litigation, requires the 
relevant lawmakers to gain better knowledge of the relevant foreign litigation 
systems and the jurisprudential choices underlying them.96 For this purpose, 
Professor Neuborne’s characterization of German and Swiss civil procedure, 
including his conclusion that the European courtroom “is a fortress for the 
powerful”97 is less than helpful, although I agree with him that both the 
German and the Swiss litigation probably would have been lost before a local 
court without prior legislative action to remedy some of the legal obstacles in 
their way.98 In addition, it is apparently easier to adjudicate human rights 
violations allegedly committed in foreign lands than it is neutrally to evaluate 
one’s own past.99 
Professor Neuborne’s statement about German and Swiss procedure, 
however, is just as sadly lacking in perspective as is the view of U.S. 
litigation prevalent in continental Europe. It seems to be heavily influenced 
by the current state of the reform debate in the United States, where one 
seems to have the choice to be either in favor of the status quo and thus in 
favor of underprivileged claimants, or else one prefers procedural reform and 
thus the protection of corporations (and perhaps the courts) from “the 
 95. Id. at 184-85. See also Burkhard Heß, Die Anerkennung eines Class Action Settlement in 
Deutschland, 55 JZ 373, 382 (2000) (suggesting that exception for human rights cases be stricken from 
the black list in the proposed Convention). 
 96. See Gaining a Worldly Perspective, supra note 26. 
 97. See Neuborne, supra note 2, at 832. 
 98.  Cf., e.g., Spring v. Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft, Schweizerisches Bundesgericht 
[Swiss Federal Supreme Court], Jan. 21, 2000, BGE 126 II 145 (2000) (holding that claim by Jewish 
refugee who was handed over to German authorities after attempting to cross the Swiss border was 
time-barred and that the action of the Swiss border patrol represented no violation of international law 
at the time); Landgericht Stuttgart [district court], decision of November 24, 1999, reproduced in 21 
PRAXIS DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT- UND VERFAHRENSRECHTS [IPRax] 240 (2001) (holding a 
forced-labor claim against German companies unfounded because the German statute of limitations 
had run). But see Paul Oberhammer & August Reinisch, Zwangsarbeiter vor deutschen Gerichten, 21 
IPRAX 211 (2001) (criticizing the latter decision both for applying the German two-year statute of 
limitations applicable to labor contracts rather than the thirty-year statute applicable to claims for 
unjust enrichment in the context of forced labor and for the court’s view that that short statute of 
limitations began to run after the Two-Plus-Four Treaty of 1991 went into force, thus reversing the 
time bar imposed by the London Debt Agreement of 1953 even though no such reversal was clearly 
stated in the former treaty and even though it took German authorities at least until 1996 to realize that 
the Two-Plus-Four Treaty might have addressed this issue). 
 99. Compare, e.g., supra note 28 and text accompanying notes 28-31 with supra note 98. 
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litigation boom.” From this perspective, a procedural system lacking some of 
the features of equity is necessarily biased in favor of corporations and the 
status quo. A less cynical point of view, however, would permit a better 
assessment of the reform alternatives.100 More importantly for present 
purposes, it would allow for a more critical evaluation of the prospect of 
litigating a particular claim in a forum other than a U.S. court, especially one 
that takes the enforcement of existing law (including international law) more 
seriously, but whose judges are not perhaps as good at, or (for good reason) 
even allowed to,101 create entirely novel solutions to emerging legal 
problems.102 A more informed and less cynical perspective would also 
provide a better basis from which to assess the costs that the current U.S. 
litigation system is apt to impose on the enforcement of human rights both in 
the United States and elsewhere and on transnational litigants in general.  
III. CONCLUSION 
The Holocaust-era litigation undoubtedly has done considerable good. It 
has created a vast pool of assets for distribution among victims of the 
Holocaust whose claims had been submerged by the politics of the Cold 
War,103 and it has prompted at least the Swiss to engage in a painful 
reconsideration of their role in World War II.104 On a theoretical level, 
Professor Neuborne’s account of that litigation appears to add further support 
both to Professor Koh’s notion of transnational legal process and to the 
empirical finding of Liberal international relations scholars that the 
enforcement of international (human rights) law works best when private 
individuals and groups are provided with standing to sue before international 
and domestic tribunals.105 
 100. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 40, at 1468. 
 101. See, e.g., TRANS-ATLANTIC LAWMAKING, supra note 26, at § 9.III.C. 
 102. Cf. Professor Subrin’s observation that “[we in the United States] are good at using equity 
process and thought to create new legal rights. We have, however, largely failed at defining rights and 
providing methods for their efficient vindication.” Subrin, supra note 33, at 1001. Whether, however, 
federal civil procedure with its mostly negotiated solutions and thus its inevitable move towards 
“dispute resolution simpliciter,” see Burbank, supra note 40, at 1486, really remains “good at . . . 
creat[ing] new legal rights,” see Subrin, supra note 33, at 1001, and thus at protecting the individual 
against the status quo that much better than German and Swiss procedure, as Professor Neuborne 
claims, see Neuborne, supra note 2, at 832, is one of the questions that merit serious consideration 
within the comparative assessment here suggested. 
 103. See, e.g., Neuborne supra note 2, at 813 n.63. 
 104. See supra text accompanying note 68. 
 105. See supra text accompanying notes 15-25. 
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Upon closer examination, however, the Holocaust cases also give rise to 
difficult questions, of which Professor Neuborne mentions quite a few.106 I 
am particularly concerned with the effects on the development of 
international human rights law and on the law of transnational litigation of a 
procedural system in which outcomes appear to be only loosely, if at all, 
related to the law applicable to the case107 and whose courts have largely 
declared themselves incompetent to deal with issues of international law.108 
There were difficult problems of substantive law, including international law, 
at issue here. Apart from the issue of repose (in the case of the German 
litigation complicated by the uncertain terms of two international treaties),109 
for example, there was the question of how far, if at all, a corporation should 
be liable for human rights violations by a state if it derived profit from such 
violations; how close the connection between those violations and the action 
(or inaction) of the corporation must be; and whether such liability, of very 
recent vintage, should be imposed retrospectively regarding actions that 
occurred over one-half a century ago. These are momentous questions. Yet, I 
am not sure that the Holocaust litigation has resolved them, given that 
uncertainty about those questions, together with “informal” judicial action 
and pressure by the U.S. government, is what controlled the settlement 
negotiations.110 
As a result, I doubt that the Holocaust litigation fully supports either 
Liberal or Constructivist insights about the making and application of 
international human rights law. I suggest that lawyers and international 
relations scholars pay closer attention to these uncertainties when conceiving 
and empirically testing theories about the role of law in the behavior of 
nation states, groups, and individuals in international relations. I also suggest 
that policy makers engage the costs of the use of the current U.S. litigation 
system for purposes of enforcing human rights abroad. Among those costs is 
the perception abroad that the government and the courts of the United States 
are really engaging in power politics.111 Over time, such a perception breeds 
resentment, which, in turn, may affect outcomes in cases and issue areas in 
which the United States and its litigants do not have the upper hand.112 It may 
 106. See, e.g., Neuborne supra note 2, at 827-34. 
 107. See supra text accompanying notes 34-64. 
 108. See supra note 64. 
 109. See supra text accompanying notes 57 and 98. In the case of Switzerland and the looted 
assets claims, there was also the issue of whether the Washington Accord of 1948 barred recovery. 
See, e.g., Vagts, supra note 65, at 474. 
 110. See supra text accompanying notes 50-61. 
 111. See supra text accompanying notes 62-80. 
 112. See supra text accompanying notes 82-87, 92-93. 
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also lead to protective action that renders pursuing human rights claims more 
difficult, both in the United States and abroad.113 Addressing those costs will 
by no means be easy, and finding appropriate solutions will require a 
considerable comparative enterprise.114 
 113. See supra text accompanying notes 78-87, 94-95. 
 114. See supra text accompanying notes 96-100. 
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